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COLLABORATIVE LAWYERING: A PROCESS FOR 
INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION 
Jim Hilbert* 
I. INTRODUCTION† 
The emergence1 of collaborative law2 and the creation of the 
Uniform Collaborative Law Act have raised a number of critical issues. 
Most of the scholarship to date has focused appropriately on clarifying 
just what collaborative law is and how it is practiced,3 and examining the 
complex ethical issues that collaborative law raises.4 Many have 
explored collaborative law’s place among other recent developments in 
changing the structure of how lawyers work with clients to resolve their 
problems.5 
                                                          
 * Jim Hilbert is Executive Director of the Center for Negotiation and Justice at William 
Mitchell College of Law, where he teaches Negotiation and Advanced Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (“ADR”), and Vice President of Professional Services for Alignor, an international 
negotiation firm (www.alignor.com). The author wishes to thank Julie Husmoe for her research 
support. 
 † This Article is submitted as a follow-up to Mr. Hilbert’s co-facilitation of the session 
“Collaborative Law in Non Family Law Disputes” at the November 20, 2009 conference on the 
Uniform Collaborative Law Act at Hofstra University School of Law entitled, Collaborative Law: 
Opportunities, Challenges and Questions for the Future. 
 1. Indeed, the growth of collaborative law has been characterized as “meteoric” and 
“phenomenal.” See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law 
and the Challenge of Legal Ethics, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 237, 239 (2008) (“Collaborative law’s 
meteoric rise is well known.”); Gregory R. Solum, Collaborative Law: Not Just for Family 
Lawyers, BENCH & B. MINN., Feb. 2010, http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2010/feb10/ 
family.html (describing the “phenomenal growth” of collaborative law in the United States and 
abroad). 
 2. Collaborative law is a fairly recent form of voluntary dispute resolution. In collaborative 
law, the parties and their lawyers formally agree to use their best efforts to resolve the dispute 
through negotiation, and that if for some reason they are unable to negotiate a settlement, the 
lawyers cannot represent the parties in litigation of the dispute. See UNIF. COLLABORATIVE LAW 
ACT, prefatory note (2009), in 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421-66 (2009) [hereinafter UCLA] (discussing 
the origins and purposes of collaborative law); see also Robert C. Bordone, Fitting the Ethics to the 
Forum: A Proposal for Process-Enabling Ethical Codes, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 25 
(2005) (“Collaborative lawyers and the parties who hire them agree that the collaborative attorneys 
will serve their clients only during negotiation. Should the clients decide to change processes and 
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In addition, collaborative law has re-energized the discussion on 
how best to resolve legal disputes, particularly in family law,6 and the 
working relationship between lawyers and their clients.7 Much of the 
impetus for collaborative law comes from dissatisfaction with the 
traditional approaches to legal disputes.8 As one commentator observed: 
“Our current, traditional system of family law litigation is often 
                                                          
move toward litigation, the collaborative lawyers withdraw from representation and the clients agree 
to hire other lawyers for the litigation stage.” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. See Sherrie R. Abney, The Evolution of Civil Collaborative Law, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 495, 497-98 (2009); Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 48-50 (2004); Susan Daicoff, Collaborative Law: A New Tool for the 
Lawyer’s Toolkit, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 117-18 (2009) (detailing the history of 
collaborative law); William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging 
Practice, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 361-62 (2004); Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family 
Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 
88-92; Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Its History and Current 
Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 155, 155 (2008) (offering the founder’s “personal 
recollection of the creation and development of collaborative law”). 
 4. See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old 
Hats on New Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 505 (2003) (detailing the difficulty in 
exacting precise ethical rules for collaborative law and other forms of ADR); Joshua Isaacs, A New 
Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical Implications Surrounding Collaborative Law, 18 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 833 (2005) (discussing the inapplicability of several of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to collaborative law); Scott R. Peppet, The (New) Ethics of Collaborative 
Law, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2008, at 23 (discussing the differing opinions of scholars on what 
the proper ethical rules should be as applied to collaborative law); Larry R. Spain, Collaborative 
Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated 
into the Practice of Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 141 (2004) (discussing how the attorney-client 
relationship in a collaborative law context is different from that of litigation). 
 5. See Julie Macfarlane, The Evolution of the New Lawyer: How Lawyers are Reshaping the 
Practice of Law, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 61 (“[E]ffective negotiation and settlement skills are 
becoming increasingly central to the practice of law and occupy more of lawyers’ real time and 
attention than adversarial trial lawyering.”). Collaborative law perhaps portends another seismic 
shift in how legal disputes are resolved, following the path of mediation and unbundling. See Forrest 
S. Mosten, Collaborative Law Practice: An Unbundled Approach to Informed Client Decision 
Making, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 163, 163 (“Collaborative Law practice is an innovative client-
centered form of law that has evolved from the concepts of mediation and unbundling legal 
services.”). 
 6. While family law is still its predominant focus, the collaborative law practice has 
extended into many cases “involving contracts, partnership and corporate dissolutions, probate, and 
sexual harassment/retaliation disputes.” Abney, supra note 4, at 514. But see Tesler, supra note 3, at 
91 n.18 (“At the same time it is becoming clear that there is a unique affinity between the needs of 
divorcing couples and the conflict resolution potentialities of Collaborative Law and 
interdisciplinary Collaborative divorce team practice.”). 
 7. See Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 72 (“The changing conditions of legal practice and legal 
disputing also require the development of a new model for a working partnership between lawyer 
and client, one which is appropriate for the conditions of twenty-first century consumer needs and 
demands.”). 
 8. “American civil family law litigation has been unsatisfactory for many years.” Daicoff, 
supra note 3, at 114. 
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disastrous emotionally and financially for families and divorcing 
couples.”9 
The rise of settlements generally as the dominant form of conflict 
resolution for all legal disputes serves as testimony to the changing 
dynamics in the litigation process.10 Parties have been relying on 
negotiation and settlement for years because of the obvious benefits of 
minimizing costs, saving time, avoiding the risks of uncertainty of trial, 
controlling the outcome of litigation, and perhaps even improving the 
relationship between the parties.11 
Collaborative law takes these developments to the next level, 
prescribing negotiation as the exclusive means for dispute resolution.12 
Importantly, collaborative law promotes a certain type of negotiation, 
namely “interest-based” negotiation.13 This is a process-driven approach 
                                                          
 9. Id. at 145. The traditional litigation model is not the only challenge in family law these 
days. More than half of all family law parties now confront the daunting task of navigating the 
complexities of the family law courthouse without an attorney. See Jim Hilbert, Educational 
Workshops on Settlement and Dispute Resolution: Another Tool for Self-Represented Litigants in 
Family Court, 43 FAM. L.Q. 545, 547-51 (2009) (documenting the numbers of pro se parties in 
family court and the signficant challenges they face). 
 10. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 466 (2004); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 485, 488 n.19 (1985) (“Settlement rates of about 90% are remarkably constant in civil 
litigation, criminal cases, and family cases.”). 
 11. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 956-57 (1979). 
There are obvious and substantial savings when a couple can resolve distributional 
consequences of divorce without resort to courtroom adjudication. The financial cost of 
litigation, both private and public, is minimized. The pain of a formal adversary 
proceeding is avoided. Recent psychological studies indicate that children benefit when 
parents agree on custodial arrangements. Moreover, a negotiated agreement allows the 
parties to avoid the risks and uncertainties of litigation, which may involve all-or-nothing 
consequences. Given the substantial delays that often characterize contested judicial 
proceedings, agreement can often save time and allow each spouse to proceed with his or 
her life. Finally, a consensual solution is by definition more likely to be consistent with 
the preferences of each spouse, and acceptable over time, than would a result imposed by 
a court. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 12. Failure to resolve the matter through negotiation results in the disqualification of the 
clients’ attorneys from representing them in any litigation on the matter. See UCLA, supra note 2, 
§ 9, at 481-82. (outlining the “disqualification requirement”). “The disqualification requirement for 
collaborative lawyers after collaborative law concludes is a fundamental defining characteristic of 
collaborative law.” Id. § 9 cmt., at 482; see also Tesler, supra note 3, at 91 (“[T]he lawyers are hired 
solely to help the parties reach resolution of their differences, and . . . the lawyers may never 
participate in any adversarial proceedings between the parties.”). 
 13. John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer 
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1380 
(2003) (“[Collaborative law] provides an important structure, set of incentives, and norms favoring 
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that focuses on the underlying needs of all parties involved.14 Perhaps 
because it may merely extend the trends already embedded in the legal 
system toward more settlements and a more collaborative, problem-
solving approach to negotiations,15 the push by collaborative law for 
lawyers (and their clients) to use exclusively interest-based negotiation 
as the only means to handle legal claims is often nothing more than an 
afterthought in the face of larger concerns.16 The perhaps overlooked 
presumption of collaborative law is that the lawyers can effectively use 
interest-based negotiation.17 Interest-based negotiation does not just 
spontaneously occur, particularly between lawyers.18 Indeed, there are 
                                                          
interest-based negotiation. This is an important contribution.”). While it does not explicitly require 
“interest-based negotiating,” it is clear the UCLA means to encourage that approach as the exclusive 
negotiation strategy. UCLA, supra note 2, prefatory note, at 426 (“The goal of collaborative law is 
to encourage parties to engage in ‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘positional’ negotiations.”). The 
term “interest-based negotiation” is used as an umbrella description for the problem solving and 
collaborative approaches to negotiation. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 51-52 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981); ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 
32-33 (2000) (discussing various ways to approach problem solving and negotiations); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 795 (1984) (discussing the objectives of problem solving). 
 14. See Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be a Problem-Solving 
Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 283 (2007) (defining interest-based negotiation as requiring a 
“focus not only on the needs and values of their clients, but also on the needs and values of their 
clients’ counterparts in order to serve their clients well.”). 
 15. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text (describing the growing trend by lawyers to 
adopt interest-based approaches to negotiating the resolution of legal disputes). But see infra Part 
II.A (chronicling the many challenges lawyers have in implementing interest-based negotiating). 
 16. Criticisms of collaborative law usually center on the ethical concerns, client informed 
consent, and the disqualification requirement mandating that clients find new lawyers if they choose 
or are forced to litigate the matter. See Memorandum from the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution 
to the ABA Sections, Divs. & Members of the ABA House of Delegates 4-7 (Sept. 27, 2009), 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/DR035000/sitesofinterest_files/DRSectionMem
oreUCLAtoSectionsandDe_.pdf (detailing and addressing the specific concerns expressed by the 
ABA Litigation Section); see also John Lande, Learning from “Cooperative” Negotiators in 
Wisconsin, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2009, at 20, 21-22 (cataloging the concerns by cooperative 
law practitioners about the disqualification requirement in collaborative law). 
 17. Importantly, the UCLA does address the problem of ensuring that the attorneys at least 
attempt to practice interest-based negotiating. By requiring that attorneys withdraw if the 
negotiation is not successful, the UCLA is at the very least encouraging the attorneys to conduct the 
negotiation seriously with an eye toward actual resolution. See UCLA, supra note 2, prefatory note, 
at 426-27 (“Because of these mutually agreed upon costs of failure to agree, collaborative law is a 
modern method of addressing the age old dilemma for parties to a negotiation of assuring that one’s 
negotiating counterpart is and will continue to be a true collaborator rather than a sharpie.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 18. See infra Part II.A (highlighting some of the reasons why lawyers are not necessarily 
predisposed to use interest-based negotiating techniques). 
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often significant barriers that limit its effective use by practitioners and 
its acceptance by clients.19 
This Article addresses the process for interest-based negotiation and 
how lawyers can address these specific challenges. The Article begins 
with an overview of interest-based negotiation and its evolution in the 
legal practice.20 The Article addresses the barriers that often stand 
between lawyers and the practice of interest-based negotiation and how 
clients, too, may contribute their own limitations to the mix.21 The 
Article then discusses particular aspects of interest-based approaches and 
outlines a step-by-step process for implementing interest-based 
negotiating.22 
II. THE RISE OF INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATION 
Just as collaborative law grew out of a dissatisfaction with the 
traditional approaches it sought to replace, so too has interest-based 
negotiation grown as an alternative to an unappealing but conventional 
form of competitive legal negotiation. Over the past few decades, a mind 
shift has revolutionized the way lawyers and others think about 
negotiation.23 While alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) and other 
new approaches blossomed to try to find new and improved ways to 
resolve legal disputes,24 scholars and practitioners gravitated to a more 
principled form of negotiating and resolving disputes: interest-based 
negotiation.25 
Substantial momentum for interest-based negotiation comes from 
legal educators. Today the vast majority of negotiation and dispute 
resolution law school courses advocate for the use of interest-based 
negotiation for doing deals and resolving conflict.26 Interest-based 
negotiation has become well-recognized as the “best practices” approach 
among academics.27 The overwhelming majority of negotiation scholars 
                                                          
 19. Clients in collaborative law have an influential role in all decision making. See Abney, 
supra note 3, at 495 (“The public has begun looking for alternative ways to achieve the resolution of 
disputes in order to give individuals and companies more control over the dispute resolution process 
as well as a greater voice in the final outcome of their disputes.”). 
 20. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See Bordone, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing the origins of the modern ADR movement). 
 24. See id. at 6 (discussing the expansion of dispute resolution processes). 
 25. See Hurder, supra note 14, at 278-82 (detailing the history and development of interest-
based negotiation by lawyers). 
 26. See Bordone, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
 27.  
While most negotiation instructors continue to expose their students to various 
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recommend that lawyers adopt an interest-based approach to 
negotiation.28 
Practitioners are beginning to have the same view. More and more, 
practitioners and lawyers recognize the value of interest-based 
negotiation as well, and with good reason.29 Research shows that 
“increasingly adversarial behavior was perceived [by other lawyers] as 
increasingly ineffective.”30 Training can play an important role. 
Practitioners who have been effectively trained in the interest-based 
approach are more likely to find better solutions to deals than those 
without such training.31 
A. The Challenges for Lawyers 
Despite the wide recognition that interest-based negotiation is the 
preferred and more effective approach,32 lawyers have had a harder time 
embracing it and effectively implementing the strategy.33 Some have 
                                                          
competing models of negotiation, including competitive, adversarial, and zero-sum 
approaches, the vast majority of negotiation teaching and pedagogy identifies interest-
based negotiation, the goal of which is to expand the size of the overall pie before 
dividing it, as a “best practice” in negotiation. 
Id. at 16. 
 28. See, e.g., Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 
370-71 nn.3-4 (1996) (citing a lengthy list of negotiation scholars who recommend an integrative or 
problem-solving approach to bargaining); see also Bordone, supra note 2, at 18 (describing an 
“ever-shrinking minority of those who continue to teach ‘tricks and tips’ as the preferred approach 
to legal negotiations.”). 
 29. This is particularly true in family law. See, e.g., Gary Voegele et al., Collaborative Law: 
A Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 971, 985 (2006) (“The principle of interest-based bargaining is widely accepted as having 
particular value in family law matters involving children, since many parents recognize that the 
importance of their common interests outweigh their differences.”). Interest-based negotiation, 
however, has not yet been adopted throughout the legal practice. See infra Part II.A. 
 30. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 196 (2002). Conversely, “[w]hen 
lawyers are able to maximize their problem-solving skills balancing assertiveness and empathy, they 
are more effective on behalf of their clients.” Id. at 197. 
 31. See Bordone, supra note 2, at 19 (“We also know that parties who have been trained in 
interest-based bargaining are more likely to find value-creating trades than those who have 
not . . . .”). In fact, training in interest-based negotiation is a core prerequisite to practicing 
collaborative law. See Barbara Glesner Fines, Ethical Issues in Collaborative Lawyering, 21 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 141, 144 (2008) (“Attorneys should not undertake collaborative law 
practice without sufficient training in interest-based negotiation and other skills necessary to 
effectively assist their clients in collaboration.”). 
 32. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
 33. Indeed, for some lawyers, it is a larger problem than just embracing an interest-based 
approach. Some lawyers are just bad negotiators. See Hurder, supra note 14, at 254 (“The fact that 
lawyers are not optimally prepared to negotiate is undoubtedly one force behind the increase in 
multi-disciplinary practice. Litigants and entrepreneurs are turning to other professionals who are 
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observed that while many lawyers may understand the basic components 
of interest-based negotiating, they struggle with its execution.34 Lawyers 
(and their clients) seem either to one, go back to old habits and fall into 
adversarial modes (often in response to other lawyers employing 
competitive strategies)35 or two, employ only a partial or half-hearted 
interest-based strategy to their detriment (for example, overemphasizing 
empathy to the exclusion of asserting their own needs).36 
Part of the challenge for lawyers comes from the culture and 
structure of the legal practice. For example, the ethical rules themselves 
may create pressure to utilize less interest-based approaches.37 As one 
scholar notes, “under the [Model Rules of Professional Responsibility] 
the ABA has unambiguously embraced New York hardball as the 
official standard of practice.”38 Lawyers must wonder how to engage in 
joint problem-solving approaches while zealously representing their 
clients through puffery and other permitted tactics.39 
In addition, the legal culture still holds on to the “give-and-take” 
and more competitive forms of bargaining for doing deals and settling 
lawsuits.40 Interest-based negotiating remains “counterculture” to many 
practicing lawyers and their clients.41 Some collaborative law advocates 
even worry that “the ‘attorney personality’ itself may be an obstacle to 
                                                          
better negotiators.”). 
 34. See Lande, supra note 13, at 1363-64 & n.182. 
 35. See id. at 1380 (“Although many traditional divorce lawyers intend to act cooperatively 
and often do so, they can get easily diverted. When lawyers perceive that the opposing side is acting 
unreasonably, they often reciprocate to protect their clients and demonstrate that they will not be 
bullied.”). 
 36. Based on personal observations of the author and corroborated through discussions with 
other negotiation and ADR practitioners and scholars. 
 37. See Schneider, supra note 30, at 147 (“The duty to zealously represent is often interpreted 
to mean that lawyers should negotiate by any means possible.”). 
 38. Bordone, supra note 2, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39. Indeed, the ethical rules “explicitly permit exaggeration and puffed up claims.” Schneider, 
supra note 30, at 147. The UCLA hopes to overcome such behaviors through the disqualification 
requirement. See UCLA, supra note 2, prefatory note, at 427 (“[The disqualification requirement] 
solves the age old problem for negotiators of deciding whether to cooperate or compete in a 
situation where each side does not know the other’s intentions and ‘when the pursuit of self-interest 
by each leads to a poor outcome for all’—the famous ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ of game theory.” 
(quoting ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984))). 
 40. See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 32 
(“[A]s a matter of practice, the give-and-take of negotiation has always been a characteristic of the 
negotiating process among lawyers.”). 
 41. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn’t the World Gotten to Yes? An Appreciation and 
Some Reflections, 22 NEGOT. J. 485, 497 (2006) (“To focus on underlying interests and to approach 
another party in a negotiation with the idea of forging a joint agreement that would meet the needs 
of both parties was—and I am afraid, still is—countercultural to the way in which most parties 
approach negotiations.”). 
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effective collaborative practice.”42 
B. The Challenges for Clients 
In contrast to the traditional litigation model where clients play a 
subordinate role to attorneys in the development and implementation of 
strategy, clients in collaborative law are essential players in the 
negotiations.43 Clients are generally present during negotiations and are 
“actively participating” in the process.44 Their role is at least as co-equal 
contributors, and in many respects, they are calling the shots.45 
Clients, however, often do not necessarily have the right training or 
mindset to support interest-based negotiation. Their understanding of the 
legal system generally and how disputes are meant to be resolved are 
often poisoned by limited information from sources other than their 
attorneys.46 Unrealistic television dramas may be the real culprit 
misinforming clients about lawyers and negotiation.47 Setting aside the 
depictions of the legal system, television and other media present very 
distorted views of how to negotiate. Resolving legal disputes or other 
deal-making scenarios are often portrayed in over-the-top negotiation 
wrestling matches.48 
                                                          
 42. Daicoff, supra note 3, at 138. 
 43. “Rather than delegating decision-making responsibility to attorneys, parties are in charge 
of determining both the process and ultimate terms of the resolution.” Mosten, supra note 5, at 164. 
 44. See Lande, supra note 16, at 22 (“[T]he Collaborative-process [in Wisconsin] is done 
almost exclusively in four-way meetings.”); Tesler, supra note 3, at 91 (“All negotiations take place 
face to face, with the parties present and actively participating according to a structured sequence of 
tasks and agendas.”). 
 45. For collaborative law clients, they get to run the operation. See Abney, supra note 3, at 
498 (“The clients’ role in the collaborative process is almost the exact opposite of the role they play 
in litigation. Collaborative clients must be able to participate in every stage of the collaborative 
process. While litigation is lawyer driven, the collaborative process is client driven.”). 
 46. Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative Law: Consideration of Its 
Use in a Legal Aid Program for Resolving Family Law Disputes, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 465, 465. 
 47. Id. (“From Perry Mason and Law & Order to Judge Judy, many American consumers 
believe that legal conflict is resolved by trial—exciting, antagonistic, adversarial fights between 
lawyers. Yet common experience and research demonstrate that most legal conflict is not resolved 
between gladiators in the courtroom. Many consumers come to the legal process with this 
Hollywood portrayal as their only knowledge of the process.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Entourage: Strange Days (HBO television broadcast July 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTf3YDNAT70 (depicting a classic, overblown example of 
antagonistic haggling loaded with personal insults and expletives). Television can have a most 
powerful effect on our perceptions. See Kimberlianne Podlas, As Seen on TV: The Normative 
Influence of Syndi-Court on Contemporary Litigiousness, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21-22 
(2004) (“Individuals learn from what they see on television, and, even if they forget the specific 
elements, retain general impressions that can influence their perceptions of the world.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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In addition, the emotional content of their legal dispute itself may 
contribute to their inability to embrace an interest-based approach. While 
clients may have some experience in negotiating, most of those lessons 
are probably ill-suited to help them resolve their disputes.49 “Most 
people have very limited views of how to resolve conflict, particularly 
when they are one of the parties to the dispute.”50 Moreover, legal 
disputes (and family law issues, in particular) bring additional stress that 
may make negotiating quite difficult.51 Patterns of animosity and 
dysfunctional communication are unlikely to improve during a legal 
dispute over marital property, custody of children, or other family issues, 
for example.52 These emotions combined with their own limited 
experience create significant barriers for clients in practicing an interest-
based approach.53 
Implementing interest-based negotiation is challenging even 
without the external pressures of the legal culture and media depictions. 
The challenges to understanding and conducting effective negotiations 
can be overwhelming and intimidating to anyone. In his comments about 
the 1932 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, Albert Einstein remarked, 
“What the inventive genius of mankind has bestowed upon us in the last 
hundred years could have made human life care free and happy if the 
development of the organizing power of man had been able to keep step 
with his technical advances.”54 
 
                                                          
 49. Hilbert, supra note 9, at 560. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 54-55 (1992) (“The strong emotions attending the 
spousal divorce may pose a formidable barrier to collaborative, cool, and rational problem-solving. 
Joint problem-solving and negotiation work best with clear communication and good listening 
skills. Many couples lacked these skills during the marriage itself, and divorce is obviously an 
extremely difficult time to develop them.”). 
 53. See McLellan, supra note 46, at 479-80 (“Likewise, their negotiating experiences may 
have left them suspicious, skeptical, and overly cautious. Combine these life experiences with the 
emotionally charged atmosphere of a family law dispute, and a participant may be highly agitated 
and unwilling to trust his or her spouse, let alone the process.”). 
 54. Albert Einstein, The 1932 Disarmament Conference, THE NATION, Sept. 23, 1931, at 300. 
See also Bruce M. Patton, Can Negotiation Be Taught: On Teaching Negotiation, in TEACHING 
NEGOTIATION: IDEAS AND INNOVATIONS 7, 54 n.14 (Michael Wheeler ed., 2000) (“There is a story, 
possibly apocryphal but in character, that Einstein was asked, shortly after the Second World War, 
why, when the nearly incomprehensible secrets of the invisible atom had been unlocked, we had 
still not solved the familiar problem of war. His alleged reply: ‘Politics is more complicated than 
physics.’”). 
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III. A PROCESS FOR INTEREST-BASED NEGOTIATIONS FOR LAWYERS 
AND THEIR CLIENTS 
To overcome the barriers faced by both the lawyers and the clients 
in implementing an interest-based approach, a process55 is necessary to 
guide both players through the right method and focus.56 Importantly, 
the process discussed below was first used to settle major litigation.57 It 
was designed originally by plaintiffs’ civil rights and antitrust lawyers to 
support negotiation strategies that they had been using with clients for 
years.58 Use of the process on its own had already resulted in settlements 
of a wide range of lawsuits from desegregation and class action 
discrimination cases to international business disputes with antitrust 
claims.59 Over time, clients began to use the process on a wider range of 
negotiation challenges, including merger-acquisitions, resolving internal 
conflict, and building stronger relationships with business partners.60 
As explained more fully below, the process applies an interest-
based approach that focuses on the key information necessary for 
negotiation planning and implementation. The process walks lawyers 
and their clients61 through an interest-based approach and helps them 
capture and understand the key information.62 
                                                          
 55. The term “process” is used here to define a systematic, disciplined approach that can be 
explained to and repeated by those who use it. 
 56. See JOHN G. SHULMAN, LEVERAGING RELATIONSHIPS FOR SUSTAINABLE VALUE 39 
(2007). 
 57. See id. at 1. 
 58. The negotiation process has been formalized through software tools, paper forms, and 
other templates to capture the key information, as explained more fully below. See id. at 42 
(displaying a recent form of the paper worksheet Alignor has used with clients to support the 
negotiation process). 
 59. See id. at 1. 
 60. The international negotiation firm Alignor was formed to handle these negotiations. See 
Alignor About Us, http://www.alignor.com/aboutus.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010). Alignor would 
later brand the negotiation process “The Alignor [P]rocess.” See Alignor, http://www.alignor.com/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2010). For a perspective from an Alignor client on the use of the process for 
resolving litigation as well as putting together complex business deals, see WILLIAM T. MONAHAN, 
BILLION DOLLAR TURNAROUND: THE 3M SPINOFF THAT BECAME IMATION 166-81 (2005) (sharing 
examples and commentary on use of the “Alignor Process” at Imation Corp. as told by the former 
CEO and Chair of the Board). 
 61. One key feature of the interest-based process described is its capacity to promote 
transparent and effective attorney-client communications. Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of 
Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the 
Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 853-54 (1987) (“[T]he problem-solving approach is 
premised on the assumption that negotiators consult regularly with their clients.”). 
 62. MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 175. 
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The process unpacks interest-based negotiation into its simplest, 
elemental forms.63 As noted above, the challenges to implementing 
interest-based negotiation are significant.64 Yet effective negotiation can 
be done, even by clients without training and with emotional and 
experiential constraints if the necessary steps are understood and 
simplified.65 By isolating the necessary steps, the process makes simple 
what is required for both preparation and implementation of an interest-
based approach.66 As a result, the process (known commercially as “The 
Alignor Process”) has been taught to and used by business executives, 
judges, lawyers, students, and Head Start parents, among many others.67 
The process uses three simple steps: (1) who is involved and what 
do they need?; (2) what can be done to satisfy those needs?; (3) what 
happens if there is no agreement?68 While straightforward and easy to 
understand, each step enforces hard thinking and requires detailed and 
complete pieces of data, as outlined below. 
A. Step One: Who Is Involved and What Do They Need? 
The first step in the negotiation process uses three concepts: 
stakeholders, issues, and interests.69 Stakeholders are the people or 
organizations involved in, or affected by, the negotiation.70 Issues are 
matters or things of concern to any stakeholder, and they could matter to 
more than one stakeholder.71 Interests are the needs of the stakeholders 
on any particular issue.72 Step one is the identification (or 
modification)73 of this key information: stakeholders, issues, and 
interests.74 As an example, consider the typical, relatively oversimplified 
divorce with a custody dispute between the wife and husband. 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 168 (noting the Alignor process is broken down into three easy steps). 
 64. See supra Part II.A–B (detailing the many barriers lawyers and clients face in effectively 
using interest-based negotiation). 
 65. Clients (and lawyers presumably) need to understand the “how to” in simple, bite-sized 
chunks—in terms of things they can do and understand. See Roy J. Lewicki, Seven Teaching 
Challenges for Business School ADR, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 113, 128 (1998) 
(“We need to break down ‘negotiating skill’ into specific component skill sets which we can teach, 
drill and measure.”). 
 66. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 168. 
 67. Alignor pioneered this three step process as a system for negotiating in any context. See, 
e.g., SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 38-44 (applying the three step process for handling particularly 
difficult negotiators). 
 68. The three steps appear in many different forms, but the underlying methodology is always 
the same. See id.  
 69. Id. at 42. 
 70. Stakeholders, of course, can include non-parties and even people not “at the table” during 
the negotiation, including business partners, spouses, potential customers, or anyone else who is 
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The first step is to identify the stakeholders to the negotiation, 
which would include the wife and the husband (and could also include 
others, such as any children, the wife’s parents or husband’s parents, or 
even the parties’ lawyers, for example).75 This is followed by the issues, 
going stakeholder by stakeholder, and identifying what each stakeholder 
may care about concerning the negotiation.76 Here the issues might 
include the timing of the resolution of this matter, which parent will 
have custody (or joint custody), and the splitting of the assets.77 
                                                          
affected by the outcome of the negotiation. See, e.g., Gregory S. Weber, Initial Steps Towards an 
Assessment of the Potential for a Collaborative Approach to Colorado Delta Ecosystem 
Restoration, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 79, 86 (2006) (describing the many 
stakeholders involved in resolving a major environmental matter through an interest-based 
approach). 
 71. Issues are not necessarily problems, but are those matters at stake in the negotiation, such 
as challenges, concerns or obligations of the stakeholders. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 
13, at 11-13 (describing issues involved in a hypothetical negotiation between a landlord and 
prospective tenant). Of course, one negotiation challenge that often arises is an overemphasis on one 
particular issue (typically money), sometimes to the exclusion of all others. See id. at 28 
(demonstrating how parties can resolve conflict by identifying important non-monetary issues); 
Harold I. Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2004, at 
56, 58 (“When both sides thinks [sic] the dispute is about money and who is right and who is wrong, 
they are framing the dispute in a very narrow way. This prevents them from seeing other issues and 
opportunities for mutually beneficial trades.”). 
 72. In any decision or negotiation, people evaluate how well any set of options will satisfy 
their interests. Interests are therefore the engine driving all decisions and negotiations. Importantly, 
the analysis must focus on the stakeholder’s actual needs from the stakeholder’s perspective, not 
what might be “typical” for that type of person or client. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 
804. 
 73. Because it is process based, lawyers and their clients can revisit and update the analysis 
throughout the negotiation as new information is obtained or circumstances changed. Accordingly, 
the discussion of interests is not meant only as a one-time event. Lawyers and clients return to their 
(shared) analysis over and over again as they advance their understanding and prepare to implement 
strategies. It encourages lawyers to listen carefully to and confirm the interests of their clients (in 
addition to the other stakeholders). See, e.g., Tesler, supra note 3, at 111 (“The protocol in a typical 
Collaborative divorce team collaboration is that before negotiations take place, there will be honest 
exploration of the clients’ values, interests, goals, and concerns.”). 
 74. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 168. 
 75. See supra note 70. 
 76. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 168.  
 77. For purposes of being as precise as possible in the analysis, there is a distinction between 
issues and interests. Issues are the topics or matters of concern, rather than the actual description of 
the underlying needs. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 28 (describing the difference between 
the identification of issues and interests). It is important to describe issues as objectively as possible 
so that the underlying interests of the stakeholders can be identified without distorting the analysis. 
In the example, the issue concerning the custody of the children is properly defined as “parenting 
plan” or “custody” rather than “keeping my kids,” which would be an interest. By describing the 
issue objectively, underlying interests can be identified clearly and their relationship can be 
explored with limited bias. 
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After the stakeholders and issues, the last part of step one is the 
identification of the specific interests of each stakeholder on each 
issue.78 Using the example on the issue of custody, there is the 
consideration of the wife’s possible interest (as the first stakeholder), 
which could be to make sure that the wife controls the custody or gets 
full custody; while the husband’s interest might be to have sufficient 
contact or access to his children. A similar process for each issue 
continues until all of the stakeholders’ interests have been identified. 
As detailed more fully below, the information is compiled in an 
interest chart,79 which might look something like this: 
 
STAKEHOLDERS: 
 
ISSUES: Wife Husband 
Well-being of the Children PRESERVE PRESERVE 
Conflict / Emotional Pain MINIMIZE MINIMIZE 
Timing of Resolution ASAP ASAP 
Legal Fees and Costs LIMIT LIMIT 
Child Support AMPLE SUFFICIENT 
Parenting Plan / Custody WIFE CONTROL ACCESS 
House / Property KEEP LIQUIDATE 
 
© Alignor 1999–2010. 
                                                          
 78. Naturally more than one stakeholder may have an interest on a particular issue, and the 
relationship between those stakeholders’ interest can be quite useful to understand. See infra note 82 
and accompanying text.  
 79. See SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 42 (displaying an Alignor Process Worksheet graphic). 
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 As shown above, in addition to identifying the substantive interest 
(e.g., ample or sufficient), there is also the relationship between 
stakeholder interests and the importance of each interest to the particular 
stakeholder. For example, on the issue of the house and property, both 
the wife and husband have their own actual interests on that issue. In this 
example, the wife wants to keep the property while the husband wants to 
liquidate (perhaps to pay off some debt or cover future child support). 
These interests are opposite, while stakeholder interests on other issues 
could be the same or different, as shown above, but not opposite. 
In each case, it is worth noting the relationship between stakeholder 
interests for each issue.80 Similarly, the importance of the interest to each 
stakeholder (critical, important, or not important) is added to the 
analysis.81 For example, the wife’s interest in minimizing the conflict and 
emotional pain (where her interest in preserving the well-being of the 
children might be critical), and the husband’s interest in minimizing the 
conflict and emotional pain might be critical. By thinking through both 
the relationship between interests and the particular weight parties give 
to the individual interests, the true insights emerge. It is in the 
identification of possible trade-offs in the future, based on differences in 
the value of interests between the parties, where creative solutions will 
lie.82 
                                                          
 80. While it may be quite obvious what the relationship between interests might be when 
thinking about only one issue, such as well-being of the children, it is entirely a different matter to 
try to keep all of the stakeholder interest relationships in mind in a negotiation with ten or more 
different issues. Displaying where the interests are in common or merely different, but not opposite, 
can help negotiators order their talking points and keep their clients informed and on the same page. 
 81. Critical interests are near deal-breakers, important issues matter but can be more easily 
exchanged as necessary to satisfy critical interests, and unimportant interests do not really matter to 
stakeholders. Importantly, it may not be necessary to satisfy every critical interest for a particular 
stakeholder, so long as a sufficient number of their critical interests are satisfied and the overall 
package is better for them than the alternatives. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value 
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995). 
The first, and perhaps most general, source of value creation relates to differences 
between the parties. Students in negotiation courses often erroneously believe that win-
win negotiations somehow depend on finding similarities—common interests shared by 
both sides. In fact, it is characteristically differences in preferences, relative valuations, 
predictions about the future, and risk preferences that fuel value-creating opportunities. 
The basic principle is fundamental to economics: Trade should occur—and surplus can 
be created—when one party places a high relative value on a good or service that the 
other party values less highly. 
Id.; see also Hurder, supra note 14, at 267 (“Finding something that has less value to the person 
who has it than it does to the person who needs it can create value. This is possible because people 
can have complementary interests, i.e., interests that are not mutually exclusive, interests that can be 
met without harming the other.” (footnote omitted)). 
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From a best practices standpoint, the process enforces an interest-
based approach by both lawyers and their clients because each must 
adopt the perspective of every stakeholder and presume what each 
stakeholder wants on the individual issues.83 After initial identification 
of the step one information, lawyers and clients then have the 
opportunity to test and reevaluate interests (or discover new interests) of 
the parties during the negotiation or preliminary discussions. As a result, 
they are thinking and listening in terms of parties’ interests as well as 
considering how the relationship between interests and the importance of 
interests play into the decision making of the various parties.84 
B. Step Two: What Can Be Done to Satisfy Those Needs? 
Step two uses three separate activities: brainstorming possible 
actions,85 evaluating those actions, and putting together packages of 
actions that could form a proposal or agreement. First, there is 
brainstorming as many actions as conceivable, using the interest chart as 
a guide, going issue-by-issue.86 The process of brainstorming can be 
structured so that actions are identified not just to satisfy the client’s 
interests, but to address all of the stakeholders’ interests. Because the 
focus is on all of the stakeholders’ interests (through use of the interest 
chart), the brainstormed list is much more comprehensive than what 
might otherwise be generated.87 Also, by being systematic,88 it 
“counteracts the tendency of many lawyers to be overly critical and to 
seek only the ‘best answer’ to a problem as a result of their personalities 
or their legal training.”89 
                                                          
 83. See id. at 267-68. 
 84. The creation of the interest chart enforces empathy and requires lawyers and clients to 
map out the interests of each party, something that is easier to discuss than to actually do. See 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 795 (“The principle underlying such an approach is that 
unearthing a greater number of the actual needs of the parties will create more possible 
solutions . . . .”). 
 85. Actions are possible options for satisfying the interests of stakeholders through a 
negotiated agreement. They are specific components that could be part of a possible proposal or 
eventual deal, such as (1) allowing the husband to have the kids on every other Thanksgiving, (2) 
agreeing to split all legal fees, (3) a mutual non-disparagement clause, and (4) establish ground rules 
for parenting. 
 86. The process for brainstorming is relatively straightforward. It is most helpful to start with 
the first issue and go issue-by-issue down the interest chart creating possible actions to satisfy all of 
the interests for that issue, including interests of all of the parties. By going issue-by-issue and 
looking at the interests of all of the stakeholders, the number of possible actions can be quite robust, 
and it is also a comprehensive list of what could be done to satisfy any interest of any particular 
stakeholder. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 809 (“The needs of the parties, therefore, 
may serve as a springboard for potential solutions to the problem.”). There is also a significant 
relationship-building aspect for lawyer and client: 
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Once brainstorming is finished, the possible actions are then 
evaluated.90 The lawyer and client can carefully consider together the 
impact of each action on all stakeholder interests.91 The process for 
evaluation maintains an objective approach to consideration of each 
possible action by enforcing a systematic review of each action against 
each interest.92 
After evaluating the actions, the lawyer and client can see how 
various combinations of actions (action plans) would impact the interests 
of the stakeholders. They can evaluate various combinations against the 
interests and look at which combinations make the most sense. They can  
                                                          
Brainstorming actively involves the client in the negotiation process, builds rapport, and 
often provides the client with a more realistic picture of the difficulties to be faced 
during the negotiation. Brainstorming with the client also increases the likelihood that 
negotiations will yield desirable results. Clients, particularly those engaged in businesses 
or other specialized activities, frequently know more about their problems and possible 
solutions than do the lawyers. In addition, several individuals brainstorming about a 
problem tend to generate more potential solutions than only two negotiators, and thus 
they increase the likelihood of finding a solution that satisfies the underlying needs of 
both parties. 
Gifford, supra note 61, at 850. 
 87. Fostering the process of creative thinking and generating innovative options is difficult. 
See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem-Solving, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 697, 707-08 
(2004) (discussing the limitations to what is known about enhancing creativity). As a process point, 
when clients brainstorm possible actions, it is important to clarify that they are not taking a position 
or committing to a given course of action, particularly if they are enlisting the help of others or even 
other stakeholders. Brainstorming is merely imagining all of the possibilities for satisfying 
stakeholder interests through a joint decision or negotiated agreement. That way, every idea, even 
actions that on their own might be quite unappealing, are unearthed in the search for the ideal 
package of possible actions. See Gifford, supra note 61, at 849 (“The participants in a brainstorming 
session are encouraged to articulate whatever possible solutions come to mind, regardless of how 
ridiculous or nonviable they initially appear. The lawyer and client suspend critical evaluation and 
judgment until all possible proposals have been listed, and only then do they consciously and 
systematically consider the viability of each option and its advantages and disadvantages.”); see 
also MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 38 (“When brainstorming, avoid the temptation to critique 
ideas as they are being generated.”). 
 88. Without some sort of structure, it is very challenging to truly brainstorm creative ideas. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in 
Legal Education? 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 97-98 (2001) (discussing the challenges to “the 
‘creation’ of solutions to legal problems” in the legal education context). 
 89. Gifford, supra note 61, at 850. 
 90. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 38 (“[E]valuation should be a separate activity, 
not mixed with the process of generating ideas.”). 
 91. See Gifford, supra note 61, at 849 (describing how the lawyer and client together 
“consciously and systematically consider the viability of each option and its advantages and 
disadvantages”). As an aside, the lawyer or client can limit the evaluation to only those actions that 
might realistically be included in a possible proposal or eventual deal (and dispose of any actions 
that have no chance of being in the mix) to speed up the process. 
 92. Even though each action was generated from a focus on a particular issue in the 
brainstorming, actions may impact interests on multiple issues. 
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also see whether various combinations might fail to satisfy (or even 
harm) critical interests of certain stakeholders, and modify the action 
plan accordingly.93 They can brainstorm additional actions to include in 
the action plan, if needed, particularly for their own interests.94 The 
analysis can then help the lawyer when communicating a proposal to the 
other party by helping organize how to be explicit about how each 
proposal component impacts the actual interests of that party. 
C. Step Three: What Happens if There Is No Agreement? 
Step three includes the same activities as step two, brainstorming, 
evaluating, and considering various packages or plans. The focus of step 
three, however, is not on agreement, but rather on what might happen if 
there is no agreement. Instead of actions designed to satisfy interests, 
step three concerns stakeholders’ “fighting alternatives.” Unlike the 
concept of best alternative to negotiated agreement (“BATNA”),95 
fighting alternatives are the things stakeholders might do not only to 
satisfy their own interests unilaterally,96 but also things they could do 
that might harm the interests of others.97 
                                                          
 93. Of course, it is not necessary for a proposal to satisfy every interest of every stakeholder. 
In fact that would be impossible. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 263. 
 94. One should try to find sufficient value for the other side, and certainly avoid derailing the 
negotiation by being too one-sided. See id. at 263 (advising against “asking for too much”). 
 95. See FISHER & URY, supra note 13, at 101; see also Renee A. Pistone, Case Studies: The 
Ways to Achieve More Effective Negotiations, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 425, 437 (2007) (“The 
client’s BATNA is defined as what will happen (or what is the best that I can do) if the negotiation 
does not work and/or we do not settle.”). The term BATNA is firmly entrenched in the negotiation 
and dispute resolution lexicon. See MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 326 n.5 (“The term has 
gained wide acceptance in the negotiation literature.”). 
 96. SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 44. 
 97. While certainly parties must understand their “Plan B” in case there is no agreement, the 
concept of fighting alternatives goes beyond just what a party might do in the alternative to an 
agreement. Parties will not only pursue their respective BATNAs, but they will also likely pursue 
courses of action that could harm the interests of the other parties, whether intentional or not. 
Negotiators must also understand the impact of what other parties might do if there is no agreement. 
See David A. Lax & James K. Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, in 
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 97, 98-100 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 
1999) (discussing the necessity for close examination of the alternatives to a negotiated agreement 
that are available to all parties); see also SHULMAN, supra note 56, at 44 n.1 (“While ‘fighting 
alternatives’ is similar to ‘BATNA,’ I have found that in the real world the absence of a negotiated 
agreement means more than just people trying to satisfy their own interests unilaterally. The 
absence of a negotiated agreement—particularly when you are dealing with difficult people—often 
means conflict! And conflict means people impose consequences against their perceived adversaries 
even when those imposing the consequences do not themselves benefit from the consequences.”). 
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The brainstorming in step three is similar to step two, as the lawyer 
and client together identify all of the possible fighting alternatives in a 
systematic manner.98 There are, however, two important distinctions. 
First, unlike possible actions for a negotiated agreement, fighting 
alternatives are unilateral things that a stakeholder can do regardless of 
whether other stakeholders agree to that alternative.99 Therefore, each 
stakeholder has its own set of fighting alternatives.100 Second, since 
fighting alternatives (unlike negotiated actions) are pursued unilaterally 
and are not part of an agreement with other stakeholders, they may or 
may not actually happen.101 Accordingly, it is necessary then to predict 
the likelihood that a given fighting alternative, if attempted, will actually 
occur.102 
The methods for evaluating fighting alternatives and examining 
packages of fighting alternatives are identical to the processes in step 
two, with the exceptions noted above. After the brainstorming is 
finished, fighting alternatives are evaluated against all of the 
stakeholders’ interests. The lawyer and client can then review the impact 
of various combinations of fighting alternatives on stakeholders’ 
interests and even generate talking points or scenarios on how packages 
of fighting alternatives actually affect a particular stakeholder’s interests. 
The analysis then provides the necessary counterbalance to consider 
various proposal options and make decisions about which path serves the 
client’s interests best.103 
                                                          
 98. As with brainstorming actions in step two, there is a structured approach by using the 
interest chart, starting with the first issue and thinking of every possible fighting alternative that 
might impact stakeholder interests. 
 99. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 170. 
 100. Therefore, as part of a comprehensive risk assessment, the client must not only consider 
its own alternatives, or its BATNA, but it must also consider what the other stakeholders might do if 
there is no agreement. See, e.g., MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 32-33 (discussing from a 
slightly different perspective the importance of knowing your BATNA as well as anticipating the 
BATNAs of your negotiating counterparts). 
 101. See MONAHAN, supra note 60, at 170-72 (expounding on the general principles of fighting 
alternatives). 
 102. For example, while the likelihood for the husband of threatening to bring a certain motion 
may be one hundred percent, the likelihood of actually filing that motion may only be forty percent, 
and prevailing overall may be only twenty percent. 
 103. See Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of 
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“By definition, 
whenever there is a negotiated agreement in a two-party negotiation both parties must believe that a 
negotiated outcome leaves them at least as well off as they would have been if there were no 
agreement.”); Pistone, supra note 95, at 459 (“In choosing which strategy to employ the attorney 
needs to consider what her client’s hopes and fears are. Specifically, how good or bad the client’s 
BATNA is should play a large part in determining the negotiation [strategy] . . . .”). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In making interest-based negotiation the exclusive tool for lawyers 
in helping clients with their disputes, collaborative law asks again 
whether lawyers (and their clients) are as effective and willing as they 
could be in implementing that approach. The barriers to effective use by 
both lawyers and clients are significant, but with the right focus and 
systematic structure, interest-based negotiation can fulfill its promise as 
the best practice104 for resolving legal disputes and for improving the 
attorney-client working relationship. 
                                                          
 104. See Schneider, supra note 30, at 196. 
